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Abstract
Emails are unquestionably one of the most popular communication media these days.
Not only they are fast and reliable, but also free in general. Unfortunately, a significant
number of emails received by email users on a daily basis are spam. This fact is annoying,
since spam emails translate into a waste of user’s time in reviewing and deleting them. In
addition, spam emails consume resources, such as storage, bandwidth, and computer
processing time. Many attempts have been made in the past to eradicate spam emails;
however, none has been proved highly effective. In this paper, we propose a spam-email
detection approach, called SpamED, which uses the similarity of phrases in emails to detect
spam. Conducted experiments not only verify that SpamED using trigrams in emails is
capable of minimizing false positives and false negatives in spam detection, but also it
outperforms a number of existing email filtering approaches with a 96% accuracy rate.
Keywords: Fuzzy set model, similarity measures, phrase matching, information
retrieval
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1. Introduction
Emails are used by hundreds of millions of users everyday because they constitute a
reliable, fast, and free media of communication. However, the main drawback of this
communication media is the excessive amount of unsolicited email messages (i.e., spam
emails) that reach a user’s inbox. According to the August 2007 Monthly Report prepared by

(a) Percentage of an average employee’s
work day spent on processing emails

(b) Spam emails classification according to
the Symantec report published in March
2008
Figure 1: Statistical data on spam emails

Symantec, 69% of the daily received emails are spam. The spamming problem is getting
worse, instead of better, even though the designers of email servers are well-aware of the
problem. The consequence follows as email users waste their time in processing spam
emails, which also consume valuable resources, such as unnecessary expenses on filtering
spam emails. For example, as reported by [13], spam emails indirectly cost on the average
each corporation 4.2 million dollars annually due to lost productivity of their employees who
take, on an average, 10 minutes per day individually to sort out spam emails, which is on
top of the work performed by IT staff in handling spam related issues within the company.
In fact, the driving force behind electronic communication these days causes the amount of
time spent on processing emails to grow rapidly. As presented by the Radicati Group [7], a
Market Research Firm, the percentage of an average employee’s work day spent on
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processing emails jumps from 17% in 2003 to 26% in 2006, and the projected percentage
is 41% in 2009 (see Figure 1(a)).
Attempts have been made in reducing spam emails received daily by users, ranging
from developing advanced spam filtering tools [4] to passing anti-spamming laws in the
U.S.A. [6] to prevent spammer from sending unwanted emails. However, the percentage of
spam emails that reach email users is growing, instead of reducing, and it has reached
78.5% of the total number of emails, as reported by Symantec [26] in March 2008.
One of the main reasons for the increased amount of spam emails is because they do
not cost spammers anything: “Because email technology allows spammers to shift the costs
almost entirely to third parties, there is no incentive for the spammers to reduce the
volume” [10]. A significant issue of spam emails is their content: most of them are simple
annoying; however, a considerable percentage of spam emails contain offensive materials.
Furthermore, spam emails that appear to be legitimate trick users into providing important
personal information, i.e., phishing. For example, the Symantec report published in March
2008 shows that fraud and scams emails, in addition to emails with adult content, add up to
more than 20% of the emails (see Figure 1(b)).
Several approaches have been adopted in reducing the number of spam emails: (i)
the machine learning approach, which uses a group of spam and legitimate emails for
training a learning algorithm so that future incoming emails can be automatically
categorized (as spam or legitimate) [4]. (ii) IP address filtering [4], which is a heuristic
approach that relies on the sender’s IP address in an incoming email to determine its
legitimate value. (iii) The Blacklist (Whitelist, respectively) method, which rejects (accepts,
respectively) an email with address that can be found on the list. (iv) Cryptography [8],
which requires an email E to be digitally signed by an authorized correspondent; otherwise,
E will be discarded by the filter. Unfortunately, spammers have found ways to evade these
spam filtering tools, along with others, as shown by the number of spam emails received
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these days. Thus, we need more reliable and sophisticated approaches that are capable of
minimizing, if not eliminating all of the, spam emails.
P. Graham [5] has made a valid point in spam detection “I think it’s possible to stop
spam, and that content-based filters are the way to do it. The Achilles heel of the spammers
is their message. They can circumvent any other barrier you set up. They have so far, at
least. But they have to deliver their message, whatever it is. If we can write software that
recognizes their messages, there is no way they can get around that.”We believe (i)
adopting the content-similarity approach, which compares incoming emails with spam
emails marked by the user, and (ii) using the phrases, i.e., n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3), in the
emails for detecting similar content, is the most promising method towards spam email
eradication 1 . In this paper, we present a novel spam detection approach that first computes
F

F

the degree of similarity of two emails, i.e., an incoming email E and a spam email S,
according to the fuzzy correlation factors of words (i.e., unigrams) in E and S, which
constitute phrase (of length 2 and 3) correlation values to determine whether E is spam
with respect to S. The phrase matching approach has been applied successfully in detecting
similar documents [9, 19]; however, these previous works focus on exact phrase matching,
instead of (inexact) similar phrase matching, which is more sophisticated and its accuracy
has been verified by us with a 96% accuracy rate.
We proceed to present our results as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work in
filtering spam emails. In Section 3, we introduce our spam email detection approach, called
SpamED, which measures the content similarity between incoming emails and known spam
emails using the n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) in the emails. In Section 4, we present the
experimental results that validate the accuracy and effectiveness of SpamED in spam
detection. In Section 5, we give a concluding remark.

1

The unigram, content-similarity detection approach has been proved successful in solving
other problems, e.g., plagiarism detection which determines how similar an unknown
document is to a known (copyright protected) document [15].
4

2. Related work
[20] describe in detail various machine learning algorithms to filter spam. On one
hand, it has been proved that supervised machine learning is an effective and accurate
technique for spam filtering. On the other hand, more trustworthy and representative
datasets must be established to further validate the technique, which is difficult, since it is
very hard to get hold of large and realistic email corpora due to privacy issues.
In [29] munging is developed as a tool that deliberately alternates an email address
to make it unusable for e-mail harvesters who build e-mail lists for spamming purposes.
(For example, ng@cs.byu.edu could be munged as ng at cs dot byu dot edu.) This method
can temporarily deceive most of the Web-based spambots, which are programs designed to
collect email addresses from the Internet for constructing mailing lists to send spam mails.
Unfortunately, munging only provides a weak defense line in preventing user’s email
addresses from being harvested, since it is not difficult for spammers to adapt all sorts of
existing munging actions.
[25] present another content-based approach, Relaxed Online SVM (Support Vector
Machine), for detecting spam emails. Unlike ours, [25] rely on SVM, which is considered a
robust methodology for text categorization. The results presented in [25] are encouraging;
however, as stated in [25], the SVM requires training time quadratic to the number of
training examples, which is impractical for large-scale email systems running in real time to
learn new spam email tricks, which change rapidly in diverting detection tools.
[30] propose the use of ontologies to construct an effective framework to filter spam
emails, since ontologies allow for machine-understandable semantics of data, which can be
used in any system. A well-known problem of using ontologies for semantic matching is
their lack of adaptation, i.e., whenever the semantic content changes, the ontologies must
also be modified. Furthermore, the experimentation of the ontology approach in [30] is still
in an inception phase, i.e., the model is going through a learning process.

5

Since emails usually include noisy data, [27] make use of data cleansing as a
preprocessing step so that signatures, quotations, program codes, extra line breaks, extra
spaces, and misspelled words can be detected and corrected to achieve high quality email
mining. Experimental results in [27] show that when applying data cleansing to term
extraction from emails, a significant improvement on extraction accuracy occurs. Compared
with [27], our spam email detection approach does not require incoming emails to be
preprocessed, which speeds up the process of eliminating spam emails.
[11] suggest combining and correlating the outputs of multiple classifiers for
improving accuracy and reducing false positives of spam detection. [11] analyze the relative
gain and maximum possible accuracy that can be achieved for certain combinations of
classifiers to automatically choose the best combination. As opposed to our detection
approach, [11] rely upon the user’s behavior models in detecting spam emails, a user
relevance feedback strategy, which is not fully automated. Another drawback of the
approach is that, as stated in [11], behavior models are specific to a particular account, and
hence the performance of the proposed method varies depending upon the quality of data
available for modeling, the parameter settings, and the chosen thresholds.
[3] concur that spam filters should block all spam and should unblock any legitimate
messages, which is a common design goal of filtering spam emails. Since [3] suggest the
use of blacklist and rule-based methods in their statistically-based, Naive Bayesian antispam filter to improve its effectiveness, the filtering method translates into higher
computational cost.
Another spam email detection approach, as presented in [18], is the TCP damping in
which the receiving server calculates the spam score for an incoming message as the
message is delivered and artificially delays confirmation of packets in the message for likely
spam candidates. The receiver may specify a very small packet size, which would then
subject the transmitter to high overhead and very inefficient transmission, which produces a
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significant slowdown for a sender who is distributing a message to a large pool of recipients
who all flag the message as spam.
Since spam email generation techniques are continuously changing, methodologies
and techniques are frequently updated in order to solve the spam email problem.
Unfortunately, none of the existing approaches or methodologies (including the ones
mentioned above) are capable of making spam emails a thing from the past. These
approaches without a doubt were helpful towards the solution of this matter; however, they
are not infallible.
In [22], we investigated the effectiveness of using (single-)word (i.e., unigram)
similarity to detect junk emails with promising results. However, only an intuitive idea, i.e.,
a sketched design of the approach without any technical details, and limited experimental
results of the junk-email detection method are reported in [22]. In this paper, we propose
SpamED, a new spam-email detection approach, which enhances the accuracy of detecting
spam emails by considering phrase similarity (as opposed to word similarity in [22]), since
as previously mentioned, phrases reflect much more accurately the content of a given
document, i.e., an incoming email in this paper. In addition, we include the formal definition
of word/phrase similarity, a thorough experimental study of SpamED, and performance
evaluations between SpamED and other well-known spam-email detection approaches, such
as Naive Bayes, Maximum Entropy, and Support Vector Machine.

3. Our spam-email detection approach
In this section, we introduce the overall design of SpamED, our spam email detection
approach. In Section 3.1, we first discuss spam emails marked by the user, and in Section
3.2 we describe the process of computing the word (i.e., unigram) correlation factors that
can be used for detecting spam emails. In order to minimize the number of false positives
and false negatives during the process of detecting spam emails, in Section 3.3 we present
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the method that analyzes the content of the subject and the body of an incoming email for
spam detection, since the subject of a legitimate email usually reflects the content of the
body. Further enhancement of our spam detection approach is proposed in Section 3.4, in
which we address the idea of enriching our unigram similarity matching by phrase matching
using bigrams and trigrams to accurately asset the degree of similarity of an incoming email
and a previously marked spam. The entire spam email detection process is described in
Section 3.6. As the contents of spam emails are constantly changing, new spam emails
might be missed by SpamED. In Section 3.7, we detail the process of adding newly marked
spam emails to the original core.

3.1.

User’s perspective towards spam emails

Due to personal preferences and different information needs, an email considered to
be spam by one user may not necessarily be spam to others. For example, some users
might consider travel advertisements as valuable, whereas others might treat them as
totally useless. Thus, it is essential to consider the user’s preference in classifying incoming
emails as (non-)spam. With that in mind, the user of SpamED is expected to provide a
number of previously received spam emails, which constitute the core of the sample spam
emails. The core is updated hereafter with newly received spam emails (marked by the
user) that are dissimilar (in content) to the ones in the core and hence are not detected as
spam by SpamED. The amount of emails to be included in the core vary among different
users according to (i) the quantity of emails previously marked as spam and (ii) the user’s
preference of what constitutes spam emails. However, the size of a core does not affect the
performance of SpamED in detecting subsequent spam emails in the long term.

3.2.

Correlation factors and threshold values

Many known commercial email servers, such as Yahoo (http://www.mail.yahoo.com),
Hotmail

(http://www.hotmail.com),

Gmail

(http://www.gmail.com),
8

and

Thunderbird

(http://www.thunderbird.com), rely on user’s feedback to improve their filtering techniques,
an exact approach that we adopt. However, we treat spam emails marked by each user
individually, whereas commercial email servers collect spam emails from hundreds of
thousands, believing that what constitutes spam for some people constitutes spam for
everybody [23]. As a result, the number of emails that are incorrectly labeled as spam (i.e.,
false positives) is high 2 . Another problem encountered by these email servers is the
F

F

excessive number of false negatives generated in email filtering, i.e., newly arrived spam
emails that are undetected even though they are very similar to the ones that have been
labeled as spam, which we encounter on a daily basis. Unlike commercial email servers, our
SpamED not only obtains high success rate in detecting (similar) spam email (see Section
4) but also reduces the number of genuine emails treated as spam, which is vital to the user
on account of the valuable information found in legitimate emails. We detail the design of
our content-based spam email detection approach below.
In [15], a set of Wikipedia documents (taken from http://www.wikipedia.org/) was
used for computing the word(-to-word) similarity values, i.e., the correlation factors of
words, according to the (i) frequency of occurrences and (ii) proximity (i.e., relative
distance) of words 3 in each document, and is defined as
F

F

(1)

where d(wi, wj) represents the distance between the occurrence of any two words 4 wi and wj
F

F

in a Wikipedia document D, and V (wi) (V (wj), respectively) denotes the set of stem

2

Lyris (http://www.lyris.com), an email marketing software company, reports in January 2007 that the percentage
of false positives filtered by U.S. email servers is between 0.57% and 18%.
3
In each Wikipedia document D, stopwords (such as articles, conjunctions, prepositions, etc.) were first removed
(since they often carry little meaning) and non-stop words in D were stemmed to reduce all the words to their root
forms. As a result, the number of words to be considered in D was reduced.
4
From now on, unless stated otherwise, whenever we use the term “word,” we mean “non-stop, stemmed word.”
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variations of wi (wj , respectively) in D. The normalized correlation factor of wi and wj,
denoted Ci,j ([ א0, 1]), is defined as

(2)

Table 1: The word-correlation factors of two spam emails, as shown in Figures 2 and 3,
respectively
The normalized (word) correlation factor, which considers the size (in terms of the
number of words) of each document in which the corresponding word appear, can be used
for measuring the degree of similarity between words in any two given emails, a known
spam email and an incoming email, by SpamED.

3.2.1. Word-to-Document

correlation factors and email similarity

Using the (normalized) word correlation factor Ci,j between words i and j, we compute
the similarity of each word in the content descriptor (i.e., the subject and the body) cde of
an incoming email e addressed to user A to each of the words k in its counterpart cdj of a
known spam email j marked by A in the core. The higher the (word-to-document)
correlation factors between a word i in cde and the words in cdj, the higher the word-spam
email factor μi,j , which is defined as

(3)
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Example 1 Table 1 shows the correlation factors between (some of) the words in an
incoming email 5 in Figure 2, which is spam with respect to a previously marked spam email
F

F

as shown in Figure 3, whereas Table 2 shows (some of) the correlation factors between an
(legitimate) incoming email in Figure 4 and the marked spam email in Figure 3. As shown in
Tables 1 and 2, the correlation factors among the words of a legitimate and a spam email
are lower than the ones between the two spam emails. □

Table 2: The word-correlation factors of the legitimate email in Figure 4 and the spam email
in Figure 3

Figure 2: A portion of an email that is spam with respect to the known spam email in Figure
3
Once the μ-value of each word in the content descriptor cde of an incoming email e
with respect to the ones in cdj of a known spam email j is computed, we determine the

5

In order to preserve the anonymity of the email receivers, the email addresses to whom
the emails were delivered were omitted
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degree of similarity between e and j using Equation 4, which calculates the average of the
μ-value of each word ui (1 ≤ i ≤ n) in cde with respect to each of the words in cdj.

(4)

where n is the total number of words in cde, and Sime,j [ א0, 1].

Example 2 Using the μ-values of all the words in cde of the incoming email e in Figure 2
computed against every word in cdj of the spam email j in Figure 3, we calculate the
similarity value of the two emails using Equation 4, which yields Sime,j = 0.38. Furthermore,
the similarity value between email e in Figure 4 and email j in Figure 3 is Sime,j = 0.11. □

Figure 3: A portion of a previously marked spam email

Figure 4: A portion of a legitimate email, which should not be treated as spam with respect
to the known spam email in Figure 3
12

3.2.2. Determining the Sim-TH value
After the degree of similarity between an incoming email e and a spam email is
computed, we must decide whether e should be treated as spam. We define a threshold
value, denoted Sim-TH, to draw the conclusion 6 . To establish Sim-TH, experiments were
F

F

conducted using (i) the test cases in the Sim-TH set (see Table 3) and (ii) each potential
Sim-TH value, to determine the number of false positives and false negatives. The ideal
Sim-TH value should (i) reduce the number of undetected spam emails (i.e., false
negatives) to a minimum and (ii) avoid eliminating legitimate emails (i.e., false positives)
which could hold great value to the user of SpamED.
The Sim-TH set contains different training sets of spam and legitimate emails, which
were provided by various sampled users who used different commercial email servers (such
as Thunderbird, Gmail, Hotmail, etc.) to guarantee the impartiality of SpamED. This
collection of emails consisted of previously labeled (spam and legitimate) emails that were
received between December 2006 and April 2007. Figure 5(a) shows that Sim-TH = 0.16
has a 92% accuracy (defined as the number of correctly-detected emails over the total
number of emails examined by SpamED, as given in Equation 8 in Section 4.1) in detecting
spam emails and minimizing the number of false positives, since at 0.16 the number of false
negatives is among the smallest, whereas the false positives are the minimal among all the
Sim-TH values.

6

We compute the content similarity between an incoming email e and each marked spam email j in the spam email
core C until either Sime,j ≥ Sim-TH (i.e., e is spam) or Sime,j < Sim-TH for each spam email j in C (i.e., e is not
spam).
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Table 3: Test cases in the Sim-TH set

Even if lower Sim-TH values have a slightly higher accuracy ratio, such as 93%, they
also have a higher number of false positives. Thus, given an incoming email e and a marked
spam email j, if Sime,j ≥ 0.16, then e is treated as spam; otherwise, e is treated as
legitimate, assuming that Sime,j < 0.16, for each spam email j in the core.
We have further verified the correctness of the chosen Sim-TH threshold value using
another test set, Sim-TH2, which contains another 100 emails, 70 spam and 30 non-spam,
randomly selected from the collection of emails provided by the users of different
commercial servers 7 , as in the test cases of Sim-TH. Using Sim-TH2, we computed the
F

F

number of misclassified emails for each of the possible threshold values. According to the
classification results on Sim-TH2 as shown in Figure 5(b), the previously established
threshold, which is 0.16, is the most ideal Sim-TH threshold value.

3.3.

Further enhancement of our detection approach

We have observed that when the similarity value between an incoming email e and a
marked spam email is too close to the Sim-TH value, e might be misclassified, i.e., SpamED
might yield either a false positive or false negative. In order to minimize the number of
misclassified incoming emails (i.e., the sum of the false positives and the false negatives), e

7

Sim-TH and Sim-TH2, however, are disjoint.
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is further examined. We first establish an appropriate range close to the Sim-TH value for
which incoming emails that fall into the range should be further analyzed in order to reduce
the number of misclassified emails. To determine the range, we considered the test cases in
the Sim-TH set again. We conducted experiments for diverse ranges close to the Sim-TH
value and analyzed the results in order to obtain the appropriate range. We observed, and
manually verified, that incoming emails that have a similarity value higher than 0.22 with
respect to a marked spam email are highly likely spam, whereas emails with similarity value
lower than 0.10 with respect to each spam email in the core are often legitimate. Thus, we
considered different ranges between 0.10 and 0.22.

Figure 5(a): False Positives (FPs), False
Negatives (FNs), and Accuracy computed by
using different Sim-TH values and the test
cases in the Sim-TH set as shown in Table 3

Figure 5 (b) - False Positives (FPs), False
Negatives (FNs), and Accuracy computed by
using different Sim-TH values and the test
set Sim-TH2.

Figure 5(a) shows that the number of misclassified emails using the Sim-TH value =
0.16 is 8; however, using the same test cases the number (i) decreases when we further
analyze (manually) the incoming emails that have a similarity value that falls into the range
between 0.12 and 0.20 (as shown in Figure 6) and (ii) increases for any other ranges. Thus,
we affirm that emails with the similarity values in the range between 0.12 and 0.20 are
appropriate for further analysis.
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3.3.1. Similarity between the subject and the body
We realize that the subject of a legitimate email e usually reflects the content of e,
whereas a spam email tends to do the opposite. The subject of a spam email is usually
misleading, since it is composed to catch the user’s attention and induce the recipient to
read the email with an appealing subject, using words such as Winner, Free, Re:, cheap,
etc., or phrases such as Dear Friend, Make Money Fast, etc. Moreover, since it is well-known
that the title of a document often reveals its content [16], we further evaluate the relevance
(in terms of words) between the subject and the body of an incoming email that has a
degree of similarity between 0.12 and 0.20 with respect to a known spam email.

Figure 6: Different ranges considered for further analysis using the test cases in the Sim-TH
set of emails in Table 3 with their similarity values close to the Sim-TH value (i.e., 0.16)
In order to obtain the similarity value, denoted SimSB, between the subject S and
the body B of an incoming email e, we (i) calculate the μ-value of each word in the subject
with respect to each of the words in the body of e, i.e., using the correlation factors and the
μ-values between the words as defined in Equations 1-3 and (ii) normalize the result, since
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the longer the email, the higher the μ-values between the words in the subject and the
body.

Using Equation 5 (given below), we obtain the similarity value between the subject S
and the body B of an incoming email e that reflects how closely related S and B are (in
terms of their content). The SimSB value is used by SpamED as an additional evidence to
determine whether e (with a similarity value between 0.12 and 0.20) should be treated as
spam or legitimate.

(5)

where ns (nb, respectively) is the number of words in the subject (body, respectively) of an
incoming email.

Figure 7: A portion of a spam incoming email with mismatched subject and body

Figure 8: A portion of a legitimate incoming email with matched subject and body
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Example 3 Figures 7 and 8 show two incoming emails with similarity value (with respect to
a marked spam email in the core) 0.13 and 0.18, respectively, which are between 0.12 and
0.20. Table 4 shows the low correlation factor between the words in the subject and some
of words in the body of the spam email in Figure 7 that translates into a low degree of
similarity, which is SimSB(S,B) = 0.08, whereas Table 5 shows a higher correlation factor
between the words in the subject and some of the words in the body of the legitimate email
in Figure 8 that translates into a higher degree of similarity, which is SimSB(S,B) = 0.89. □

Table 4: Correlation factors among the words in the subject and the body of the spam email
as shown in Figure 7

Table 5: Correlation factors among the words in the subject and the body of the legitimate
email as shown in Figure 8
3.3.2. Determining the SB-TH value
We proceed to define the subject-body threshold value, denoted SB-TH value, which
determines the minimum degree of similarity that the subject and the body of an email e
should hold in order to be considered legitimate, assuming that 0.12 ≤ Sime,j ≤ 0.20 for any
known spam email j. To establish the SB-TH value, we evaluated the results for diverse
values of similarity between the subject and the body using the labeled emails in different
test cases of a test set, denoted SB-TH set (as shown in Table 6). In order to be impartial,
we collected this new test set in the same manner that the Sim-TH set (as shown in Table
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3) was constructed, i.e., including different test cases with both spam and non-spam emails
provided by different users located in the USA and Argentina who used different commercial
email servers. The emails were collected during February and March 2007. The test cases to
create the SB-TH set were chosen randomly to ensure that they are representative.
According to the test results shown in Figure 9(a), we reaffirm that the subject of a
legitimate email often reflects its content and establish 0.75 as an ideal SB-TH value, which
ensures that neither the number of false positives nor the number of false negatives
dominates the other.

Example 4 We benefit by the usage of the SB-TH value on the emails in Figures 7 and 8.
The highest similarity value between the email in Figure 7 and the emails in the collected
core of marked spam emails is 0.13, whereas the highest similarity value between the email
in Figure 8 and a known spam email is 0.18. If we consider only the established Sim-TH
value (i.e., 0.16) to classify incoming emails, then the two emails in Figures 8 and 7 would
have been misclassified (as spam and legitimate, respectively). However, the SimSB values
computed between the body and the subject of the two emails in Figures 7 and 8 are 0.08
and 0.89, respectively, and SpamED is able to classify the emails correctly using their
SimSB values. □

Table 6: Test cases in the SB-TH set
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We have further verified the correctness of the previously chosen SB-TH threshold
value using the Sim-TH2 set (as discussed in Section 3.2.2) of (previously labeled legitimate
and spam) emails to compute the number of misclassified emails for the different SB-TH
threshold values. As shown in Figure 9(b), the most ideal SB-TH value is 0.75, which is the
same as the previously established SB-TH value and further confirms the correct choice of
0.75.

Figure 9(a): False Positives (FPs) and False
negatives (FNs) detected using different
threshold values on different test cases as
shown in Table 6

Figure 9(b) - False Positives (FPs), False
Negatives (FNs), and Accuracy computed
by using different SB-TH values and the
test set Sim-TH2.

Table 7, which was constructed using the test cases in the SB-TH set in Table 6,
shows that the number of false positives and false negatives is reduced when considering
the SimSB value along with the similarity value between 0.12 and 0.20 (as detailed above)
of an incoming email and any known spam email. The accuracy of the enhanced approach
(i.e., using SimSB) in detecting spam emails increases 5% (from 90% when considering
only the similarity value of an incoming email and a spam email to 95% when considering
the similarity value along with the SimSB value), which further enhances the performance of
SpamED.
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Table 7: M1, i.e., Method 1 (M2, i.e., Method 2, respectively) yields the results on using only
the Sim-TH value (SB-TH value in addition to the Sim-TH value, respectively), according to
the test cases in the SB-TH set as shown in Table 6

3.4.

The bigram and trigram detection method

As stated and supported by an empirical study in [21], the usage of short phrases (2
and 3 words) has a more positive impact on retrieval effectiveness than using phrases of
longer length (i.e., 4, 5, or more), since bigrams and trigrams increase the number of
relevant documents retrieved. ([21] claim that the usage of phrases of length 4 or longer
tends to yield unreliable results.) Hence, in addition to the unigram detection method (as
discussed in Sections 3.1-3.3), we further consider the bigrams and trigrams in emails to
compute their similarity, which should decide whether the accuracy of SpamED on unigrams
can be enhanced. If any email contains n words, there are n different unigrams, n-1
bigrams, and n-2 trigrams to be considered.
In order to compute the n-gram (2 ≤ n ≤ 3) correlation factor of any two n-gram p1
and p2, we rely on the correlation factor of each pair of corresponding ith (1 ≤ i ≤ n) words
within p1 and p2 and apply the Odds (ratio) [14] on the word correlation factors. The Odds
measures the predictive or prospective support based on a hypothesis H (i.e., n-grams)
using the prior knowledge p(H) (i.e., the word correlation factors of the n-grams) to
determine the strength of a belief, which is the phrase correlation factor in our case.
(6)
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We compute the phrase correlation factor (pcf) between any two bigrams (trigrams,
respectively) p1 and p2 as

(7)
where p1i and p2i are the ith (1 ≤ i ≤ 2 for bigrams or 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 for trigrams) word in p1 and
p2, respectively, and C is the normalized word correlation factor as defined in Equation 2.
Hence, the phrase correlation factor of p1 and p2 is generated by using the word correlation
factor of each corresponding pair of words in p1 and p2. Sample bigram and trigram
correlation factors are shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively.

Table 8: Correlation factors of some bigrams in the two emails as shown in Figures 2 and 3

Using the generated phrase correlation factors, we compute the degree of correlation
value between a bigram (trigram, respectively) pi in an incoming email e and each one of
the bigrams (trigrams, respectively) in a spam email j, denoted μpi,j , as defined in Equation
3, i.e., the equation for computing the unigram (word-to-document) correlation factors is
adopted for computing the bigram or trigram phrase (-to-document) correlation factors,
where k in the equation denotes a distinct bigram (trigram, respectively) in email j.
Furthermore, using the computed n-gram (2 ≤ n ≤ 3) correlation factors, as well as the
degree of phrase correlation μpi,j , we can establish the degree of similarity of e and j, i.e.,
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Sime,j , as shown in Equation 4, where n in this computation denotes the total number of
distinct n-grams in e.

Table 9: Correlation factors of some trigrams in the two emails as shown in Figures 2 and 3

3.5.

Considering the usage of email arrival time in SpamED

During the designing phase of SpamED, we have attempted to enhance its accuracy
by considering the time of arrival [24] of an email e, since we observed that most spam
emails arrived during the late evening or early morning hours. We used the SB-TH set (in
Table 6) to compare the number of misclassified emails close to the Sim-TH value against
the arrival time, i.e., we computed the arrival time t of e with 0.12 ≤ Sime,j ≤ 0.20 for any
spam email j in the user’s core. If t is in between 11 p.m. and 5 a.m., then e was treated as
spam; otherwise, it was treated as legitimate. Table 10, in which the accuracy percentage is
computed according to the total number of emails in its respective test case in Table 6,
shows that SpamED using the SB-TH value on unigrams outperforms the method using the
arrival time of emails by a huge margin. Therefore, our SpamED uses the SB-TH value,
instead of the arrival time of an incoming email, since the latter is not an accurate indicator
in minimizing false positives and false negatives during the spam detection process.
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Table 10: Accuracy of SpamED using unigrams and the Sim-TH value with either the (i)
email arrival time or (ii) degree of similarity between subject and body (SB-TH) in the test
cases as shown in Table 6

3.6.

The entire spam email detection process

In this section, we describe the overall process each incoming email e must go
through in order to determine whether e should be treated as (non-)spam. The detailed
process of our SpamED is shown in Figure 10.
As shown in Figure 10, when a new email e arrives (1), SpamED computes the
degree of similarity (4) between e and a previously marked spam email s in the core (2)
using the word (unigram)-correlation factors in its corresponding matrix (3) (which are used
to determine the bigram and trigram correlation factors) on n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) 8 . The
F

F

computed degree of similarity of e and s is then compared with the corresponding n-gram
Sim-TH value, which is different among the chosen unigrams, bigrams, or trigrams, as
shown in Figure 10. The process of computing Sim-TH, as well as SimSB, for bigrams
(trigrams, respectively) is the same as the unigrams for which the same test cases were
used, and the chosen threshold is the one that yields the minimal number of false positives
and false negatives. If the degree of similarity of e and s is lower (higher, respectively) than
the Sim-TH value, then e is treated as legitimate (5) (spam (6), respectively). Otherwise,
Sime,s falls into the respective Sim-TH range, which requires further consideration (see
discussion in Section 3.3), and the degree of similarity between the subject and the body of
8

Using which n-grams, i.e., unigrams, bigrams, or trigrams, is the choice of the email server on which SpamED is
installed.
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e is computed, i.e., SimSB(e, s), (7). If SimSB(e, s) is higher than the respective threshold
SB-TH, then e is treated as a legitimate email (8); otherwise, it is spam (9).

Figure 10: The evaluation process of SpamED, where U/B/T denotes the threshold values of
unigrams/bigrams/trigrams

3.7.

Additional spam emails in core

Once SpamED is employed by a user (using a predefined user’s collection of marked
spam mails), other spam emails can be added to the user’s core. Any new spam email that
is not detected by SpamED, but is later marked as spam by the user, should be
automatically added to the collection which reflects (i) a new spam email with content
dissimilar to the ones in the core or (ii) the user’s preference of what constitute spam email
has expanded. In order to prove the benefit (in terms of accuracy) of including new spam
emails to the user’s core of marked spam emails, we used random tests cases (among all
the test cases in Sim-TH and SB-TH sets as shown in Tables 3 and 6, respectively) and
analyzed the results obtained by SpamED when the undetected spam emails were either
excluded (Method A) or added (Method B) to the core.
Table 11 shows that the number of misclassified emails (i.e., false positives and false
negatives) is reduced when spam emails that are not previously detected by SpamED (since
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they are new) are added to the core of marked spam emails. As a result, the accuracy of
using Method B is 8% above the accuracy of using Method A.

Table 11: M1, i.e., Method A (M2, i.e., Method B, respectively) reflects the results when
undetected spam emails are not added (added, respectively) to the core of spam emails,
where the test sets of Cases L and M are as shown Table 7 and Case C is shown in Table 3

4. Experimental results
In order to assess the performance of SpamED, we applied SpamED on three
different email corpora: (i) “BYU,” which consists of more than 1,400 spam and legitimate
emails collected from individual users at BYU and Argentina between December 2006 and
April 2007, (ii) 2005 TREC Public Spam Corpora, “TREC05,” which includes more than
90,000

(spam

and

legitimate)

emails,

downloaded

from

the

TREC

site

(http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/cgibin/cgiwrap/gvcormac/foo), and (iii) 2006 TREC Public Spam
Corpora, “TREC06,” which consists of 37,822 (spam and legitimate) emails in English and
Chinese extracted from http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/˜gvcormac/treccorpora06/about.html. We
treated each of the TREC05 and TREC06 corpora as the collection of emails received by an
individual user, and out of each corpora, 1,200 spam and legitimate emails were randomly
chosen to conduct experimentation on verifying the accuracy of SpamED in detecting spam
emails.

4.1.

Accuracy, precision, and recall ratios

In order to analyze the accuracy of SpamED, we determined the number of false
positives and false negatives and calculated the percentage of accuracy and error rate
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according to Equation 8 using various n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) on the emails belonged to the
BYU, TREC05, and TREC06 corpora.

(8)

where the Number of Correctly-Detected Emails is the total number of emails minus the
number of false positives and false negatives. Figure 11 shows the accuracy and error rates
of using SpamED on the three corpora and different n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3), as well as the
average accuracy and average error rates. The results demonstrate that the use of trigrams
achieves the highest degree of accuracy (and hence the lowest error rate) among all the ngrams, since trigrams successfully reduce the highest number of misclassified spam and
legitimate emails.

Figure 11: Accuracy and error rates of SpamED on using various n-gram (1 ≤ n ≤ 3)
correlation factors on three different email corpora BYU, TREC05, and TREC06
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We further measured the spam precision (p) and spam recall (r) [1] as given in
Equation 9, which reflect the precision and recall ratio of SpamED in detecting spam emails,
respectively.

(9)

where NS→S denotes the number of spam emails correctly classified by SpamED, and NL→S
(NS→L, respectively) denotes the number of legitimate (spam, respectively) emails that were
treated

as

spam

(legitimate,

respectively),

i.e.,

false

positives

(false

negatives,

respectively). In addition, we computed the overall performance of SpamED using the
Harmonic Mean (also called F-measure), a commonly used measure that avoids the bias
created by (spam) precision or (spam) recall, which is defined as

. Figure 12 shows

the spam precision, spam recall, and F-measure for each of the email corpora using
unigrams, which also includes the average performance of SpamED, whereas Figure 13
shows that the trigram approach outperforms the unigram and bigram approaches in terms
of the overall F-Measure.
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Figure 12: Spam precision, spam recall, and F-Measure of SpamED on different email
corpora using unigrams

Figure 13: F-Measures of SpamED computed on using different n-grams (i.e., unigrams,
bigrams, and trigrams) and the three email corpora

4.2.

Weighted measures on legitimate emails

Since legitimate emails contain valuable information, it is important to find another
measure that reflects the deficiency of eliminating a legitimate email. We adopted the
weighted accuracy and the weighted error rates [1, 17], as defined in Equation 10, which
assign a false positive a higher cost than a false negative. Each legitimate email is treated
as if it were a λ email. As in [1], we establish several values for λ (= 1, 9, and 999) to
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penalize false positives by λ times, where λ represents an adequate number of emails. If a
legitimate email e is misclassified, then it yields a λ-error, whereas if e is classified
correctly, then it yields a λ-success.

(10)

where NS denotes the total number of spam emails, NL denotes the total number of
legitimate emails, NL→L denotes the number of legitimate emails correctly classified, and NS→S
(NS→L and NL→S, respectively) is defined as in Equation 9.
When λ = 1, discarded legitimate emails are not assigned any weight higher than the
weight of spam emails that reach the user’s inbox. When λ = 999, discarded legitimate
emails are severely penalized, since in this case blocked emails are directly deleted. [1]
recommend using λ = 9, which indicates that blocked emails are not deleted automatically,
a general practice. Furthermore, λ = 9 can be used to compute the Total Cost Ratio (TCR),
as defined in Equation 12, as a single measurement of the performance of a spam email
filtering approach.
Since when λ is assigned a high value, WAcc is also high, and as a result the
performance (in terms of accuracy) can be misinterpreted. Hence, [1] suggest comparing
WAcc and WErr to a simplistic baseline in order to obtain a more adequate evaluation of a
spam email detection approach. The adopted baseline was “no filter is present.” The
weighted accuracy and error rate of the baseline [1] and its respective TCR are defined in
[1] as

(11)
and
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(12)

Figure 14: WAcc and WErr calculated for SpamED using the BYU, TREC05, and TREC06
corpora by setting λ = 9 on different n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3)
As mentioned in [1], an effective spam detection approach should achieve a TCR
value higher than 1 in order to claim its usefulness. Figure 14 shows that when λ = 9, the
overall weighted accuracy of SpamED using any n-gram (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) on the three email
corpora is around 96% on the average, whereas Table 12 shows the TCR values using λ = 1
(TCR1) and λ = 9 (TCR9), which were calculated using the same three email corpora, along
with the overall result. In both cases, i.e., TCR1 and TCR9, the TCR values are higher than 1
(for all three email corpora), and the overall weighted error rate average is lower than 6%.
Hence, we can affirm that SpamED is accurate and useful when implemented in real world
applications 9 . Note that even when misclassifying legitimate emails (false positives) is
F

F

penalized nine times over the misclassified spam emails (as shown in Figure 14), the overall
accuracy of SpamED is still in the 95% range in most test cases. Thus, we assert that not
9

The greater TCR is, the better the email filtering tool performs.
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only SpamED is accurate in eradicating spam emails, but also keeps to a minimum the
number of legitimate emails that are misclassified.
Figure 14 shows that the weighted accuracy (WAcc) for the TREC05 and TREC06
corpora is higher when using bigrams, since its number of misclassified legitimate emails is
reduced; however, its number of misclassified spam emails is significantly higher than the
one obtained by using unigrams or trigrams. On the average, trigrams used by SpamED
achieve the highest WAcc rate, as well as the lowest WErr rate, among all the n-grams (1 ≤
n ≤ 3). Furthermore, we have also computed the TCR values (when λ = 9) using unigrams,
bigrams, and trigrams as shown in Figure 15. On the average, the use of trigrams is more
effective and outperforms unigrams. Since when the weighted accuracy was computed, only
the misclassified legitimate emails are penalized, it causes bigrams to perform slightly
better than trigrams in terms of TCR values. In addition, Figure 16 shows that by using
trigrams in detecting spam emails, we can improve the overall performance of SpamED by
close to 2% over unigrams and bigrams, since the overall weighted error rate drops to close
to 4%.

Table 12: Total cost ratio (TCR) calculated for the BYU, TREC05, and TREC06 corpora using
unigrams
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Figure 15: TCR9 values computed by using SpamED on different n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) in the
BYU, TREC05, and TREC06 email corpora

Figure 16: Weighted Error Accuracy for λ = 1 and λ = 9

4.3.

Performance evaluations between SpamED and others

In order to claim that SpamED can outperform other existing spam email detection
approaches in terms of accurately detecting spam emails while avoiding mistakenly
eliminating legitimate emails, we compared the performance of SpamED with respect to
other known spam filtering approaches.
In [1] a Naive Bayesian Classifier is adopted and in [32] a number of supervised
(learning) approaches are presented for filtering unsolicited bulk e-mails. The Naive
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Bayesian filter implemented in [1] includes a lemmatizer to reduce each word to its root
form and remove stop-words, whereas in [32] the supervised approaches are evaluated in
the context of statistical spam filtering, which include (i) the Naive Bayes and Maximum
Entropy model [31] that estimate the probability of each spam or legitimate category being
predicted, (ii) the memory-based approach, which is a non-parametric inductive learning
paradigm that stores training instances (i.e., emails) and then labels a new email according
to its similarity with a stored instance, (iii) the Support Vector Machine (SVM), which is a
supervised learning paradigm so that given a set of training data (labeled as spam and
legitimate), SVM establishes the distance between a new instance (i.e., an incoming email)
and the classification hyperplane to determine whether the email should be treated as (non)spam, and (iv) the AdaBoost, which is a framework for constructing an accurate
classification rule to detect spam emails. [32] also make use of the information within the
email header to detect spam emails. Since the spam filtering approaches presented in [1,
32] have been well-established, we consider them to be an ideal choice for performance
evaluation against SpamED.

Figure 17: TCR values for each of the approaches presented in [1, 32] and SpamED using
different n-grams (1 ≤ n ≤ 3) on the LingSpam and SpamAssasin corpora
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The public corpora used to conduct the experimentation are (i) LingSpam
(http://www.aueb.gr/users/ion/data/lingspam_public.tar.gz),

which

consist

of

2,412

legitimate messages and 481 spam messages (in which attachments, HTML tags, and
header fields within the emails were not included), which was also used in [1, 32] and (ii)
SpamAssasin (http://spamassassin.org/public corpus), a public corpus that includes 1,897
spam and 4,150 legitimate messages.
[1] and [32] both make use of cost sensitive measures presented in [1], which allow
us to compare the performance of different approaches with SpamED. Figure 17 shows that
the TCR9 value obtained by SpamED is at least 2.5 times higher than the one obtained in
[1]. Figure 17 also shows the average TCR9 values of the different approaches reported in
[32] on the LingSpam corpora and the SpamAssasin corpora, along with the TCR9 values
obtained by SpamED. The experimental results verify that SpamED is superior to each of
the approaches presented in [32] using the LingSpam and SpamAssasin corpus, especially
on using trigrams.

4.4.

Observations

As discussed earlier, trigrams outperform bigrams and unigrams. Even though both
trigrams and bigrams can reduce the number of misclassified legitimate emails (generated
by using unigrams), trigrams is more capable than bigrams in reducing the number of
misclassified spam emails, since the number of false negatives obtained using unigrams
drops significantly when using trigrams but decreases only slightly (and in some cases
increase) when using bigrams. We observe that when computing the phrase correlation
factors, exact (or closely similar) matches on longer phrases (i.e., trigrams) significantly
increase the phrase-to-document correlation factors, which contributes to higher degree of
similarity of two similar emails, i.e., an incoming email and a spam, that leads to higher
accuracy in spam email detection.
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In addition, since supervised learning approaches use (non-)spam emails to train
algorithms in search of different patterns, such us the arrival time of an email and frequent
words appeared in an email, in order to predict the probability of an email being spam [23],
while SpamED relies on the actual similarity of trigrams in emails, it might explain why
phrase similarity approach is more accurate than the supervised learning approaches in
spam email filtering.

5. Conclusions
Unquestionably, spam emails are a burden for any kind of users (from household to
student to business users) and need to be eradicated. According to the Radicati Group (a
Technology Market Research Firm) study from the first quarter of 2006, there are about 1.1
billion email users worldwide, and growing. Considering the urgent need of a reliable spam
email filtering tool, we have proposed in this paper a spam-email detection approach, called
SpamED, that makes use of the correlation factors among words in emails to discover spam
emails. By considering the similarity of words between previously marked spam emails and
new incoming emails, SpamED establishes how similar (in terms of the content of) any two
emails are. In addition, by using phrases (i.e., bigrams and trigrams) within the content of
any two emails to compute their similarity, we are able to further enhance the accuracy of
SpamED without using other existing spam-email detection methods proposed in literature,
such as Blacklist [2], Whitelist [17], the time of arrival of emails [17], use of ruled-based
heuristic centralized gateway filtering [17], digital signature [12], etc. Most of these
techniques are rather inflexible, e.g., Blacklist (Whitelist, respectively) would only reject
(accept, respectively) email with addresses specified in its corresponding list and need the
user’s constant feedback. SpamED, on the other hand, only requires the users to
occasionally mark spam emails to be added to the user’s core of spam emails, which
minimizes the processing time and overhead in eliminating spam emails.
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Experimental results have verified the correctness of our spam email detection
approach. Not only using SpamED on trigrams yields an accuracy of 96% in detecting spam
emails, but it also reduces the number of misclassified emails, i.e., the number of false
negatives and (most importantly) false positives decreases.
For future work, we are interested in constructing phrase correlation matrices for
bigrams and trigrams using phrases within the Wikipedia documents (since they are
unbiased). The computed phrase correlation factors in each matrix can be used to calculate
the degree of similarity between any two emails, which could further enhance our spam
detection approach in detecting spam emails more accurately than using solely word
correlation factors in generating phrase correlation factors. In addition, we would like to
further reduce the number of false positives (i.e., misclassified legitimate emails), since as
suggested in [11], in the real world misclassifying even one legitimate email is
unacceptable. We believe this can be achieved by assigning different weights for common
spam words, such as “free” or “money” [4], or phrases such as “Consolidate debt” or “No
obligation” [28], in SpamED.
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